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Costs and Benefits of a Revised Foxconn Project1
Timothy J. Bartik, Senior Economist
W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research
August 2019
In 2017, the State of Wisconsin agreed to provide Foxconn with almost $3 billion in state
incentives, for a flatscreen manufacturing facility in Southeast Wisconsin. The originallyplanned facility was to involve a $10 billion investment, and 13,000 jobs at reported average
salary of $53,875. Since then, the project has been significantly revised. The currently-planned
Foxconn facility is reported to involve a $2 billion investment, and 1,500 to 1,800 jobs. Still to
be determined is exactly what incentives Wisconsin will provide for the revised facility. One
possible option is to continue the original incentive offer, but scaled back to reflect the lower
amount of jobs and investment.
This memo analyzes the costs and benefits of a revised Foxconn deal that is some scaled
back version of the original Foxconn deal. In other words, the analysis here is of a possible new
state contract with Foxconn, but one that follows the credit rates of the original deal. Why
analyze a possible new contract? Because given that the Foxconn project has been significantly
revised, a new contract seems likely. Why not analyze what a scaled-back Foxconn project might
receive in incentives under the original contract? Because under the original contract, there are
many goals and timetables, and many scenarios for possible clawbacks; it is difficult to project
what might happen, legally and economically, under all these scenarios. What can be readily
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calculated are the implications of a new contract, that applies the current deal’s investment credit
rates and job creation credit rates to a scaled-back Foxconn project.
As described in this memo, either the original Foxconn incentive, or scaled back versions
of the original offer, are far greater than typical U.S. incentives. Depending upon the incentive
offer’s details—and indeed the devil’s in the details—the Foxconn incentives per job, compared
to the average investment/job credit offer by U.S. states, is 7 to 12 times greater. The present
value of the Foxconn incentive offer, in 2019 dollars, per job, ranges from $172K per job to
$290K per job under various scenarios. Average U.S. incentives are $24K per job. Wisconsin
incentive in the past have averaged $28K per job.
The Foxconn incentive offer is also greater per job than offers accepted by Amazon. The
Amazon New York offer was, depending upon the ultimate job creation, between $31K and
$46K per job. Virginia’s offer to Amazon was, contingent upon the ultimate size of this facility,
between $10K and $13K per job.
Part of the details that matter are not only how many jobs are ultimately created by
Foxconn, but what limits are imposed on the annual incentive payments. The original Foxconn
incentive offer, although very large, did impose some annual limits and total caps that stretched
out the incentive offer. These limits and caps ended up reducing somewhat the real present value
of the incentive offer. In any revised offer, the details of whether the offer keeps the original
annual and lifetime caps, or lowers them to reflect the reduced project scale, make a large
difference. Imposing lower annual limits and lower lifetime caps could lower Foxconn costs per
job by almost one-quarter, or by over $60K per job.
What do Wisconsin residents get in return for these incentives? What are the benefits,
and what determines those benefits? In the original analysis of Foxconn done by the Legislative
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Fiscal Bureau, the focus was on the state government’s fiscal benefits. The Legislative Fiscal
Bureau concluded that the Foxconn project would not fiscally break even until 2042-43.
Even as a fiscal impact analysis, the Legislative Fiscal Bureau’s report is incomplete and
overly optimistic. First, the Legislative Fiscal Bureau implicitly assumes a 100 percent
probability that without the incentive, none of these 13,000 direct jobs would have been created
by Foxconn, or by any substitute firm. Second, the Legislative Fiscal Bureau ignored the impact
of job creation on population growth and the consequent needs for expanded public services.
As shown in this memo, under a realistic fiscal impact analysis, even if none of the
Foxconn jobs would have been created without these incentives, fiscal benefits of Foxconn will
never come close to offsetting the incentive costs. After accounting for population growth effects
on public service needs, the present value of fiscal benefits is likely to offset no more than 20
percent of the incentive costs.
Of course, the purpose of government, and specifically of government economic
development programs, is not to make money for the government. The government is not in
business to make a profit, but rather to advance its constituents’ well-being. If incentives such as
Foxconn induce job growth, they can enhance residents’ well-being by increasing employment to
population ratios (employment rates) and real wages. Offsetting these costs are possible negative
effects of paying for the incentives. Foxconn’s incentives come out of the spending side of the
state budget. Assuming that this results in cuts in various state spending programs, these
spending cuts also have effects on the state economy. In particular, cuts in education spending
can damage workers’ skills and state residents’ wages.
How do these various benefits and costs balance out? Using a model of how state
economies operate, I analyze the benefits and costs of the revised Foxconn project under various
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scenarios. I assume for this analysis that without the incentives, none of the 1,500 to 1,800 jobs
at the revised project would have been created in the state. Under this assumption, the benefitcost ratio—here calculated as all benefits and costs other than incentives, divided by the
incentive costs—range from 0.71 to minus 0.02. That is, it seems likely that the revised project
has benefits less than costs.
This benefit-cost analysis is overly-optimistic in several respects. First, without the
incentives, even if the Foxconn project disappeared, it seems likely that there would be some
substitute job-creation for the 1,500 to 1,800 Foxconn jobs. The infrastructure, land, and labor
that would have been tied up in the Foxconn project can be used in alternative ways. The number
of substitute jobs is probably less than the 1,500 to 1,800 Foxconn jobs, but on the other hand
more than zero.
Second, this analysis assumes that the employment rate effects of the revised Foxconn
project will be similar to average job creation in a local economy. Yet some reports suggest that
the revised Foxconn project will mostly stress jobs with very high skill requirements. Higher
skill requirements are likely to reduce the proportion of jobs that go to non-employed state
residents, and increase the proportion that go to in-migrants to the state.

COST ANALYSIS
Analyzing the costs per job of the revised Foxconn project requires some assumptions
about exactly how the original incentives will be scaled back. The original incentives were
nominally a 17 percent wage credit for 15 years, and a 15 percent investment credit. However,
the incentive agreement between the state of Wisconsin and Foxconn put various annual and
lifetime limits on these incentives. In particular, the annual wage credit caps did not fully allow
4

for any inflation over time in wage rates. In addition, the investment credit had a lifetime cap that
was 13.5 percent of the $10 billion planned investment, and also spread out the investment credit
over seven years. The lack of full inflation adjustments to the wage credit, and the spreading out
and lifetime cap to the investment credit, reduced somewhat the real present value of the
incentives.
To deal with this, I calculate possible revised Foxconn incentives under four different
scenarios. All scenarios assume $2 billion in investment. The scenarios differ along two
dimensions. One dimension is whether the jobs created are 1,500, or 1,800. The other dimension
is whether the limits in the original incentive offer are retained as written, or ratcheted down to
reflect the reduced scale of the project. If the original limits are retained as is, then the wage
credits would simply be awarded at 17 percent, and the investment credits at 15 percent, and the
original limits would mostly not be binding on total incentives paid, which increases the amount
of the incentive. If the original limits are ratcheted down to reflect the reduced project size, then
these annual and lifetime caps would continue to reduce the value of the incentive.
I then calculate the present value of these incentives, in 2019 dollars. This present value
assumes that the annual inflation rate between 2018 and 2034 will be 2 percent. In addition, I use
a fairly standard social discount rate of 3 percent—that is, the same real dollar a year from now
has a present value of 3 percent less this year. This real discount rate reflects that people place a
somewhat higher value on dollar flows this year rather than many years from now.
For comparison, I also calculate the present value of incentives per job for other states’
jobs tax credits and investment tax credits. I calculate the present value of incentives offered to
Amazon by New York, and to Amazon by Virginia. Amazon recently agreed to accept these
states’ offers, although Amazon ultimately backed out of the New York deal, due perhaps in part
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to political opposition. For both the New York and Virginia Amazon deals, I consider two
scenarios, as both agreements have a phase one of 25,000 Amazon jobs, followed by a phase two
that would involve up to 40,000 jobs in New York, and 37,850 jobs in Virginia.
I also calculate the average state jobs credits and investment tax credits per job from my
2017 Panel Database on Incentives and Taxes (Bartik, 2017). This database attempted to
quantify the “usual deal” that state and local governments offer new facilities that they want to
attract. That is, it includes deals commonly offered, and not one-of-a-kind deals such as Foxconn
or Amazon. The particular data I use is the average incentive offered over all so-called “exportbase” industries as of 2015, the most recent year in my database. This deal is averaged over the
32 states plus the District of Columbia included in the database. These geographic areas include
over 90 percent of all U.S. economic output. In addition to reporting the output-weighted average
over these 33 different areas of the present value of incentives per job, I also report the
database’s estimate of Wisconsin’s “usual deal” as of 2015.
Table 1 reports these calculations’ results. (An appendix shows the year by year
incentives in the Foxconn and Amazon scenarios.) As the Table shows, all the Foxconn deals are
far greater than average U.S. deal, Wisconsin’s past practices, or the Amazon deals in New York
or Virginia.
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Table 1 Present value (2019 dollars) of costs of state job creation tax credits (JCTCs) and investment tax
credits (ITCs) per job, various projects and state incentives, in thousands of dollars per job
Total ITC +
Project or state
Description
JCTC per JCTC
ITC
job
Original Foxconn deal
13K jobs, $10B investment
172
82
90
New Foxconn scenario, most optimistic 1,800 jobs, $2B investment,
197
80
118
ratcheted down limits
New Foxconn scenario, middle
1,500 jobs, $2B investment,
221
80
141
ratcheted down limits
New Foxconn scenario
1,800 jobs, $2B investment, keep old
260
112
148
limits and use formulas
New Foxconn scenario, most pessimistic 1,500 jobs, $2B investment, keep old
290
112
178
annual limits and use formulas
Amazon, NY, optimistic scenario
40K jobs
31
21
10
Amazon, NY, pessimistic scenario
25K jobs
46
34
12
Amazon, VA, optimistic scenario
37.85K jobs
10
10
0
Amazon, VA, pessimistic scenario
25K jobs
13
13
0
WI “usual deal,” 2015
Panel Data on Incentives and Taxes
28
15
12
U.S. average “usual deal,” 2015
Panel Data on Incentives and Taxes
24
18
6
Note: All present value calculations use annual discount rate of 3 percent. All figures are in thousands of present
value 2018 dollars per job.

As shown, the “new” Foxconn deals tend to be greater in cost per job than the original
deal. This is in part because the recent reports have a higher ratio of investment to jobs created,
which raises the costs of the investment tax credits per job.
In addition, it makes a huge difference whether the new incentives for Foxconn keep the
original annual and lifetime incentive limits—and then simply use the formulas for the 17
percent wages tax credit and 15 percent investment tax credit—or whether these credit
percentages are also limited by ratcheting down the original annual and lifetime caps. Comparing
the two 1,800 jobs scenarios, ratcheting down the old limits reduces costs per job by $63K, from
$260K to $197K. Comparing the two 1,500 jobs scenarios, ratcheting down the old limits
reduces costs per job by $69K, from $290K to $221K.
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BENEFITS ANALYSIS
To calculate the possible benefits of the revised Foxconn facility, I enter these four
different incentive scenarios into my model of the benefits and costs of incentives for state
residents and calculate the present value of various benefits and costs.
This incentive model is described more fully in Bartik (2018). But briefly, this is a model
in which the incentives are assumed to have some effect on the probability of inducing a
particular job-creation decision, with that assumed probability based either on the size of the
incentives relative to the firm’s costs, or with that probability being assigned by the analyst. This
job creation then has some assumed multiplier effects on other jobs, with the multiplier also
being assigned by the analyst. The total job creation then has effects on local employment rates
and wage rates, based on empirical studies of how job growth shocks affect these local labor
market variables under various initial labor market conditions. The job creation also increases
property values. The increased wages and property values have some negative effects on other
job creation, and also reduce profits of some local business owners. The effects of local job
creation on employment rates, employment to population ratios, immediately implies effects on
local population growth. These job growth and population growth effects are used to calculate
effects on state and local tax revenue, and state and local spending needs. The incentive costs,
net of any fiscal benefits from revenue effects exceeding spending needs, must be paid for in
some way, and this has economic costs. For example, any tax increase or spending cut has some
negative demand side effects on a state’s economy. And the model allows for cuts in spending on
K-12 education to have some long-run negative effects on state wages. The model follows a
state’s economy for 80 years, to allow for the full impact of long-term effects due to education
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cutbacks. All effects in later years are discounted back to the present, using a 3 percent real
discount rate, so a dollar effect in year 80 is worth only less than ten cents in present dollars.
For this specific simulation, the baseline model is altered in the following ways:
•

The Foxconn incentive is assumed to be “decisive,” in that none of these jobs or any
substitute jobs would locate in Wisconsin without the incentive.

•

The assumed input-output multiplier is 2.39, which is the more optimistic multiplier in
the Baker and Tilly report on the Foxconn project.

•

The baseline unemployment rate is 2.8 percent, Wisconsin’s current unemployment rate.

•

The net cost of the incentives, minus any fiscal benefits, are assumed to come from
reduced state and local public spending. Out of that reduced public spending, 21.7
percent comes from reduced K-12 spending, based on Census of Governments data that
this is the average share of state and local public spending in Wisconsin that goes to K-12
schools.
Table 2 summarizes the overall benefits and costs of the Foxconn incentives and job

creation for Wisconsin residents, with various types of effects identified. As shown, the model
includes not only estimated incentive costs, but various other benefits and costs. The other
benefits and costs include fiscal benefits, labor market benefits due to higher employment rates,
wage losses due to the education spending cutbacks, and effects on property values and local
business profits. The ratio of all these other benefits and costs to incentive costs is calculated as
the benefit-cost ratio. A benefit-cost ratio of greater than one is required for a project or policy to
have net benefits. The benefits and costs are all calculated in present value dollars as of 2019.
As the Table shows, net fiscal benefits are slight relative to incentive costs. Incentive
costs range from $341 million to $482 million, and net fiscal benefits range from $55 million to
$68 million. The Foxconn job creation, and the associated multiplier job creation, does generate
considerable increases in state and local tax bases and hence tax revenue. However, over 90
percent of this is offset by increased needs for public expenditure due to an expanded population.
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Table 2 Costs, Benefits, and Benefit-Cost Ratios for Revised Foxconn Project, Various Scenarios
Present value below in millions of
1,800 jobs,
1,500 jobs,
1,800 jobs,
1,500 jobs,
2019 dollars of
new limits
new limits
old limits
old limits
Incentive costs
(366)
(341)
(482)
(447)
Increased state/local tax revenue
1,672
1,362
1,573
1,272
Increased state/local public service
(1,603)
(1,306)
(1,506)
(1,217)
needs
68
56
67
55
Fiscal benefits = revenue − needs
Labor market benefits (higher
433
354
414
337
employment rate effects on earnings
and wages)
Wage loss due to K-12 spending
(346)
(338)
(501)
(479)
cutbacks
Net other benefits (property value
103
84
98
79
gains plus losses to local businesses
due to higher costs)
Gross benefits (all effects except
259
157
78
(8)
incentive costs)
Benefit-cost ratio (ratio of gross
0.71
0.46
0.16
(0.02)
benefits to incentive costs)
Note: All figures except benefit-cost ratio are in millions of present value 2019 dollars, using 3 percent annual social
discount rate. Figures in parentheses are negative numbers or costs.

The job creation resulting from Foxconn does increase employment rates, and this puts
some upward pressure on Wisconsin wage rates. Countering that is that the cutbacks in K-12
reduced wages. As it turns out, these two effects tend to be of similar size. The costs of the
education cutbacks tend to dominate if the incentive costs are larger relative to job creation. The
key point here is that net incentive costs are not just a dollar cost to the state government, but
also potentially an economic cost to the state economy and state residents.
The net ratio of other benefits and costs, to incentive costs, ranges from 0.71 to −0.02. In
other words, in all four scenarios, the Foxconn project on net costs more than its benefits.
However, in the most optimistic scenario, the net losses due to the Foxconn incentives are only
29 percent (100% − 71%) of the incentive costs. The project does produce some significant
benefits for state residents in this scenario, just not as much as it costs.
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FACTORS AFFECTING BENEFITS VERSUS COSTS
Like any model, these benefit-cost results depend upon various assumptions made.
Varying some assumptions will change benefits versus costs. On the whole, as I will now
discuss, I suspect that the benefit-cost results in Table 2 are likely to be somewhat overoptimistic.
Among the assumptions that might be changed are: but-for percentage; multiplier;
employment rate effects; public spending needs; economic effects of spending cuts.
But-For Percentage
Table 2 assumes that without the incentives, none of these 1,500 or 1,800 jobs, or any
substitutes, would exist in the state. This is an extreme assumption. More realistically, the land
and infrastructure developed for Foxconn in southeast Wisconsin would find some alternative
use.
To fully ascertain plausible substitute effects would require a detailed economic study of
plausible alternative uses for the Foxconn site, and possible direct jobs generated. In the absence
of such a detailed, site-specific study, one could rely on statistical averages. If one enters the
maximum cost per job incentives into the model, the 1,500 jobs scenario with the old limits used,
the model says that such incentives would be expected to have a “but for” of 73 percent. That is,
on average, if one compared one state that offered such incentives to all projects, with another
state that did not offer such incentives, the job creation in the state that did not offer the
incentives would be 27 percent as great as the state that did offer the incentives. If we applied
this statistical average to the 1,500 jobs at the Foxconn project, this implies job creation in
substitute jobs of about 400 jobs without the incentives. But a site-specific study would give a
better estimate.
11

Multiplier
Various input-output job multipliers have been suggested for the Foxconn project: 2.71
by EY (2017); 2.39 and 1.93 in two different scenarios for Baker Tilly (2017). For the model
used to generate Table 2, I somewhat arbitrarily picked the middle multiplier from these three
choices, that is 2.39.
None of these estimated multipliers are fully satisfactory. None of these multipliers, for
example, is based on a region specific study of the use of Wisconsin versus Illinois suppliers in
southeast Wisconsin. None of these multipliers relies on empirical data on commuting patterns
and purchase patterns of workers in southeast Wisconsin and the neighboring region of Illinois. I
suspect that a more empirically-based multiplier would find more leakages into Illinois than in
the current multiplier, but how big these extra leakages would be is hard to know without more
data.
Employment Rate Effects
Both the labor market benefits and fiscal benefits are affected by employment rate
effects, per job created. The larger the employment rate effects, the larger the labor market
effects. In addition, the larger the employment rate effects, the lower the population growth
effects of job growth, and hence a lower impact on spending needs, and thereby higher fiscal
benefits.
The model behind Table 2 implicitly assumes that the Foxconn jobs and the multiplier
jobs are like “average” jobs. Average jobs that are created in a state’s economy are immediately
filled by some combination of three sources: hiring already-employed state residents; hiring nonemployed state residents; hiring in-migrants. Jobs filled by hiring already-employed state
residents results in a new job vacancy, that is filled in the same three ways. Ultimately this
12

vacancy chain is only terminated when all newly created jobs have resulted in some mix of nonemployed state residents being hired, or new residents. Mathematically, an increase in
employment must either ultimately increase the state’s employment to population ratio, or
increase its population—there is no ultimate alternative. The relative mix of employment rate
effects versus population effects depends upon the relative proportions of local non-employed
versus in-migrants hired along the job vacancy chain.
The issue is whether it is proper to treat the Foxconn jobs as “average jobs.” The new
Foxconn project reportedly will include a high mix of very skilled and very highly-educated
workers. This raises the odds that for at least the direct jobs created, the vacancy chain will be
more abruptly terminated by significantly above-average hiring of non-state residents. If so, the
results in Table 2 overstate the local employment rate benefits, and overstate the fiscal benefits.
Public Spending Needs
The results in Table 2 do not allow for any extraordinary costs for extra needed
infrastructure from the additional jobs. Implicitly, they assume excess capacity in existing
infrastructure in southeast Wisconsin. To the extent to which this is untrue, the results in Table 2
overstate the fiscal benefits of the Foxconn project. Overcoming this limitation of the model
would require a specific case study of the Foxconn project and of infrastructure conditions and
needs in southeast Wisconsin.
Some of these extra infrastructure costs have already been incurred by local governments
in southeast Wisconsin. Hence, these are sunk costs and should not be counted in benefit-cost
analyses moving forward from the present moment. However, there will also be extra
infrastructure costs associated with expanded population, which are not included in the Table 2
fiscal analysis.
13

Economic Effects of Spending Cuts
The model behind Table 2 assumes that only lower spending on K-12 has any
productivity effects on the economy. In addition, the model assumes relatively high economic
benefits to K-12 spending, although benefits consistent with some recent economic studies of
how K-12 spending affects earnings, specifically the study by Jackson, Johnson, and Persico
(2015).
On the one hand, one could assume lower effects of K-12 spending on Wisconsin
residents’ earnings than is assumed in the model. On the other hand, other areas of state and local
public spending might have economic effects on Wisconsin residents, for example funding for
university and technical colleges, public health, childcare, police and fire, and infrastructure.
Bottom Line
The bottom line is that it seems likely that Table 2 is optimistic. A full evaluation of
Foxconn with more precise estimates of various economic parameters would probably lower the
benefit-cost ratio.
The most important conclusion of this analysis is that it is difficult to come up with
plausible assumptions under which a revised Foxconn incentive contract, which offers similar
credit rates to the original contract, has benefits exceeding costs. The incentives are so costly per
job that it is hard to see how likely benefits will offset these costs.
The project does have a better benefit-cost ratio if the incentive costs are significantly cut
back. If the state government decides to move ahead with the Foxconn incentives, the details of
how the Foxconn incentives are limited or capped make a big difference in the project’s net
benefits.
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APPENDIX
This appendix gives more detail on the incentive costs assumed to generate the different
Foxconn and Amazon scenarios.
The original Foxconn plan incentive payments are directly taken from the November
2017 agreement between Wisconsin and Foxconn. As mentioned, although the incentives are
technically paid as a 17 percent wage tax credit for 15 years, and a 15 percent investment tax
credit, there are various limitations implied in the maximum incentive schedule. In particular, the
wage payment maximums do not allow for full inflationary adjustment of the initial wages.
Furthermore, the total investment tax credit is limited to $1.35 billion, which is only 13.5 percent
of the planned investment of $10 billion. Furthermore, the investment tax credit is paid out over
seven years.
In the reduced Foxconn scenarios, one possibility is that the wage credit will continue to
be limited to not allowing for full inflation adjustments, and that the maximum investment tax
credit will be limited to 13.5 percent of $2 billion and allocated evenly across seven years. These
are the scenarios described as new limits or ratcheted down limits.
A second possibility is that the reduced Foxconn scenarios will keep the old annual limits
and lifetime caps of the original contract, but simply allow the reduced scale project to claim 17
percent wage credits for 15 years and a 15 percent capital investment tax credit. This scenario
provides significantly higher incentives than the ratcheted down limits.
Table A1 reports all five scenarios from 2018 to 2034. The calculations assume that
Foxconn’s wages per employee increase with overall price inflation by 2 percent per year from
2017 until 2034.
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Table A1 Possible Payments in Millions of Nominal Dollars Under Various Foxconn Deals
1,800 jobs all years, 1,500 jobs all years, 1,800 jobs all years, 1,500 jobs all years,
Original Plan
new limits
new limits
old limits
old limits
Jobs Investment Jobs Investment Jobs Investment Jobs Investment Jobs Investment
Year
Jobs credit
credit
credit
credit
credit
credit
credit
credit
credit
credit
2018
1,040 10
2019
2,080 19
193
2020
5,200 48
193
14
12
17
14
2021
9,100 84
193
14
39
12
39
17
193
15
193
2022
13,000 120
193
14
39
12
39
18
107
15
107
2023
13,000 121
193
14
39
12
39
18
15
2024
13,000 121
193
14
39
12
39
19
15
2025
13,000 121
193
14
39
12
39
19
16
2026
13,000 122
14
39
12
39
19
16
2027
13,000 122
14
39
12
39
20
16
2028
13,000 122
14
12
20
17
2029
13,000 122
14
12
20
17
2030
13,000 123
14
12
21
17
2031
13,000 123
14
12
21
18
2032
13,000 124
14
12
22
18
2033
14
12
22
18
13,000
2034
13,000
14
12
23
19
Sum
1,350
208
270
173
270
297
300
247
300
— 1,500
(nominal
dollars)
Note: All costs are rounded to millions of dollars. Job numbers are actual figures in contract plans.

The Amazon scenarios for New York and Virginia are taken directly from the agreements
between the states and the company. These have different annual scenarios for jobs created and
payments made. For both state projects, the contracts distinguish between a phase 1, which
encompasses creating 25,000 jobs, and a phase 2, which goes up to 40,000 jobs (New York) or
37,850 jobs (Virginia). Table A2 shows New York, and Table A3 shows Virginia.
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Table A2 Amazon, New York
Year
Jobs
Jobs credits
2019
700
6
2020
2,900
25
2021
5,900
52
2022
7,900
69
2023
11,900
104
2024
15,900
139
2025
17,900
156
2026
20,789
182
2027
23,150
202
2028
25,000
218
2029
26,500
2030
27,750
2031
31,750
2032
35,000
2033
40,000
Total
1,154

Investment credits
35
30
42
28
55
55
28
40
33
26
18
15
48
39
60
551

NOTE: 2029 on is only if jobs created goes from 25K to 40K. Figures for
credits are in millions of nominal dollars, unadjusted for inflation. Figures
for jobs are actual jobs.

Table A3 Amazon, VA
Year
Total jobs
2019
400
2020
1,580
2021
3,544
2022
4,983
2023
7,648
2024
10,000
2025
11,643
2026
13,850
2027
16,850
2028
19,850
2029
22,155
2030
25,750
2031
27,850
2032
31,750
2033
34,850
2034
37,850
2035
37,850
2036
37,850
2037
37,850
2038
37,850
2039
37,850

New jobs, phase 1 New jobs phase 2
400
1,180
1,964
1,439
2,665
2,352
1,643
2,207
3,000
3,000
2,305
2,845
750
2,100
3,900
3,100
3,000

Totals

Phase 1 credits

Phase 2 credits

9
26
43
32
59
52
36
49
66
66
51
63

550

NOTE: Credits are in millions of nominal dollars. Jobs are actual jobs numbers. Phase 1 are new jobs up to 25,000.
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12
33
61
48
47
200
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